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So What Is the Real Legacy
of Oakes?
Two Decades of Proportionality
Analysis under the Canadian
Charter’s Section 1
Sujit Choudhry*

I. OAKES AND BRIAN DICKSON
As we reflect upon the 20th anniversary of R. v. Oakes,1 it is hard not to
think of Brian Dickson C.J., for the two are inextricably tied together in
the Canadian constitutional imagination. This is true not only for the
obvious reason that the former Chief Justice penned the majority
judgment, but also because Oakes has come to be synonymous with the
former Chief Justice’s broader jurisprudential legacy. For along with R.
v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,2 Hunter v. Southam Inc.,3 Singh v. Canada
(Minister of Immigration and Employment),4 and Reference re Motor
Vehicle Act (British Columbia), s. 94, 5 Oakes set the tone for the early
years of the Dickson Court. Oakes spoke in a boldness and confidence
that permeated the Court’s early Charter case law. Indeed, it clarified the
Court’s interpretive methodology for Charter cases, perhaps most
centrally that rights are of presumptive importance, and limitations the
*

Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. © Sujit
Choudhry, 2006. E-mail: sujit.choudhry@utoronto.ca. web: <www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty/
choudhry>. Thanks to Aharon Barak, Peter Hogg and Ira Parghi for helpful comments, and to
Bernadette Mount for editorial assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. This article draws upon S.
Choudhry, “Worse than Lochner?” in C.M. Flood, K. Roach & L. Sossin, eds., Access to Care,
Access to Justice: The Legal Debate over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2005), at 75.
1
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter “Oakes”].
2
[1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter “Big M”].
3
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
4
[1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter “Singh”].
5
[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference”].
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exception that are only acceptable if governments meet a demanding test
of justification. The citation of Oakes by courts in Antigua and
Barbuda,6 Australia,7 Fiji,8 Hong Kong,9 Ireland,10 Israel,11 Jamaica,12
Namibia,13 South Africa,14 the United Kingdom,15 Vanuatu16 and
Zimbabwe17 has made Oakes one of the central models for rights-based
constitutional adjudication, and has only confirmed its status as the
poster-child of the Dickson Court.
So the Court’s almost immediate retreat from Oakes in Edwards
Books, acknowledged and consolidated soon thereafter by Irwin Toy
Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),18 is of broader constitutional
significance, both domestically and abroad. If Oakes was a model for
how to interpret the Charter, and how rights-protecting documents in
other jurisdictions should be construed, the question is what kind of
model it remains two decades on.19 In an important sense, this is a
completion of the circle, given the importance of comparative models to
the drafting of section 1.20 And rather than merely telling us something

6

Attorney-General & Anor v. Goodwin & Ors, [1999] I.C.H.R.L. 143.
Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth, [1998] HCA 22; Mulholland v. Australian Electoral
Commission, [2004] HCA 41.
8
Chaudhry v. Attorney-General, [1999] FJCA 28.
9
R. v. Sin Yau Ming, [1991] HKCA 96.
10
Blascaod Mor Teoranta v. Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland, [1998] IEHC 38.
11
United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49 P.D. 221; Ron Menachem
v. Minister of Transportation, P.D. 57(1) 2345.
12
Jamaica Bar Association v. Ernest Smith & Company, [2003] JMSC 17.
13
Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs & Ors, [1995] I.C.H.R.L. 56.
14
S v. Zuma, 1995 (2) SA 642; S v. Coetzee, 1997 (3) SA 527; S v. Manamela, 2000 (3)
SA 1; Case v. Minister of Safety and Security, 1996 (3) SA 617; S v. Bhulwana, 1996 (1) SA 388; S
v. Singo, 2002 (4) SA 858.
15
Ex Parte Kebeline, [1999] UKHL 43; R. v. Lambert, [2001] UKHL 37; A (FC) v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56.
16
In re the Constitution, Korman v. Natapei, [1997] VUSC 46.
17
Chavunduka v. Minister of Home Affairs, [2000] I.C.H.R.L. 34.
18
[1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]; R. v. Edwards
Books & Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713].
19
I have explored the use of comparative models in constitutional adjudication in:
“Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional
Interpretation” (1999) 74(3) Indiana L.J. 819; S. Choudhry, “The Lochner Era and Comparative
Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) Int’l J. Const. L. 1; S. Choudhry, “Migration as a New Metaphor in
Comparative Constitutional Law” in S. Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (New
York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2006).
20
B. Hovius, “The Limitation Clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights: A
Guide for the Application of Section 1 of the Charter” (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 213; L.E.
Weinrib, “Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?” (2002) 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 119.
7
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about section 1, 20 years of the Court’s coming to terms with Oakes
sheds light on its evolving self-understanding of the judicial role under
the Charter. The fate of Oakes holds broader lessons for the fate of the
Charter and the judicial review of rights-protecting constitutional
instruments more generally.
There is a dominant narrative on what the true legacy of Oakes and
the retreat from Oakes are.21 The argument is that Oakes set out a
uniform approach for assessing justifiable limitations on Charter rights
irrespective of differences in context, but that in the decade following
Oakes, the Court searched for criteria of deference, to reliably and
predictably categorize cases where deference was warranted and those
where it was not. These categories were not applied consistently by the
Court, and, indeed, produced disagreement within the Court over how
they should be applied in specific cases. Underlying both trends were
concerns regarding the cogency of the distinctions employed by the
Court to delineate the boundaries of these categories. The broader lesson
of Oakes is the need to tailor judicial review to the unique context of
each case.
Although the dominant narrative captures much of Oakes’ legacy, it
misses much of what is at stake in many recent section 1 cases, and by
implication, what the true legacy of Oakes and the retreat from Oakes
are. In my view, Oakes created an enormous institutional dilemma for
the Court, by setting up a conflict between the demand for definitive
proof to support each stage of the section 1 analysis, and the reality of
policy making under conditions of factual uncertainty. And so the
legacy of Oakes is that the central question of section 1 is how the Court

21
For example, see D.M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian
Production of Constitutional Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), ch. 3; E. Mendes, “In Search of a
Theory of Social Justice: The Supreme Court Reconceives the Oakes Test” (1990) 24 R.J.T. 1; R.
Elliot, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1989-90 Term” (1991) 2 S.C.L.R. (2d) 83; R.
Knopff & F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992), at 45-47; A. Lajoie
& H. Qullinan, “Emerging Constitutional Norms: Continuous Judicial Amendment of the
Constitution — The Proportionality Test as a Moving Target” (1992) 55 L. & Contemp. Prob. 285;
C.M. Dassios & C.P. Prophet, “Charter Section 1: The Decline of Grand Unified Theory and the
Trend Towards Deference in the Supreme Court of Canada” (1993) 15 Advocates’ Q. 289; J.L.
Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1996), ch. 4; K. Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or
Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), ch. 9; C.D. Bredt & A.M. Dodek, “The
Increasing Irrelevance of Section 1 of the Charter” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 175; E. Mendes, “The
Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judicial Deference in the Context of Section 1”
(2005) 27 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47; J.B. Kelly, Governing with the Charter (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005),
ch. 5.
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should allocate the risk of factual uncertainty when governments
legislate under conditions of imperfect information. RJR-MacDonald v.
Canada (Attorney General)22 is the pivotal case here, because it brought
home how the central debate in many section 1 cases is the quality of
the evidentiary record. But not only has the Court failed to recognize
this as a central question; it has failed to adopt a consistent approach in
how it answers it.23 Two recent examples which lie at the heart of this
counter-narrative are Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney
General)24 and Harper v. Canada (Attorney General).25 Although these
cases have attracted minimal attention from constitutional scholars for
their broader importance to the Court’s understanding of the judicial
role under the Charter, they warrant close attention because they tell us
that there is another legacy of Oakes.26
Understanding these problems to be the legacy of Oakes allows us
to view judgments outside the section 1 context in a different light. In
my conclusion, I will link my counter-narrative to the Court’s recent
decision in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),27 in which the Court
struck down Quebec’s ban on private health insurance. Although the
principal focus of Chaoulli was section 7, I read it through the lens of
the general problem of how to fashion judicial review in a rightsprotecting democracy where governments often legislate with imperfect
information. Neither the majority nor the dissenting judges in that case
understood the case in these terms. As a consequence, they asked
themselves the wrong question. Getting the legacy of Oakes right would
have led them to avoid this mistake.

22

[1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”].
And as the Court’s decisions in R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 2003 SCC 74
[hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”] and R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, 2005 SCC 80, illustrate,
similar questions arise outside the s. 1 context, and the Court has sent contradictory signals there as
well.
24
[1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”].
25
[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [hereinafter “Harper”].
26
Exceptions include P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 2, looseleaf ed.
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1997), sec. 35.4; R.E. Charney, “Evidence in Charter Cases: Expert
Evidence and Proving Purpose” (2004) 16 N.J.C.L. 1; R.E. Charney & Z. Green, “Prophets of
Doom, Seers of Fortune: 20 Years of Expert Evidence under the Oakes Test”, this volume; and the
Rt. Hon. A. Lamer, “Canada’s Legal Revolution: Judging in the Age of the Charter of Rights”
(1994) 28 Isr. L. Rev. 579, at 582-83.
27
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35 [hereinafter “Chaoulli”].
23
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II. THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE
The details of the dominant narrative are widely known. Section 1 was
at play in a number of early Charter judgments, in which the Court
offered some preliminary observations on how it would interpret the
provision.28 But it was not until 1986 that the Court devoted sustained
attention to section 1, in a pair of judgments handed down 10 months
apart. In Oakes, Dickson C.J. set out the analytical framework
governing section 1 interpretation, which, despite two decades of
doctrinal elaboration, qualification and modification, still provides the
basic framework within which limitations analysis is conducted. Oakes
states that parties seeking to uphold a rights-violation must satisfy a
four-part test. First, the reason for the rights-violation must be “pressing
and substantial”,29 which entails that the legislative objective must
further the values of the “free and democratic society” referred to by the
text of section 1. These values encompass a broad but not all-inclusive
set of values which underlie Charter rights which are also guaranteed by
section 1, and for that reason are the exclusive reasons that can justify
their limitation.30 The next three steps together constitute the wellknown proportionality test. Thus, there must be a “rational connection”
between the rights-infringing measure and the objective, interpreted by
the Court in Oakes to require that the means chosen be “carefully
designed” so as to minimize problems of over-inclusion. Moreover, the
measure must be the least restrictive means — i.e., the means which
impairs the right “as little as possible” — for realizing the government’s
objective. Finally, the deleterious effects of the measure must be
proportionate to the importance of the objective.31 On the facts of Oakes
itself, the Court considered a challenge to a reverse onus provision
which presumed the intent to traffic narcotics from the mere fact of

28

These early judgments were of Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec Assn. of Protestant
School Boards, [1984] S.C.J. No. 31, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66; Singh, supra, note 4; Big M, supra, note
2, and the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 5.
29
Oakes, supra, note 1, at 138.
30
Id., listed the values of a free and democratic society in the following famous passage
(at 136):
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety
of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.
31
Id., at 140.
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possession. The Court found the objective underlying the provision —
to protect society from the evils of drug trafficking — to be pressing and
substantial (although puzzlingly, it made no attempt to tie this objective
to the values of a free and democratic society). But the provision failed
the rational connection test because it was over-inclusive, since it
inferred the intent to traffic in cases of possession in which no such
intent was present.
The clear message sent by Oakes is that it sets out a “stringent
standard of justification”.32 Thus, rights are the norm and of presumptive
importance, and cannot be limited unless “the exceptional criteria which
justify their being limited” are met.33 Lorraine Weinrib correctly
observed that on Oakes, “[t]he state will seldom satisfy section 1
justification because the supreme law states that certain rights and
freedoms are to be honoured in the normal course”.34 In this respect,
Oakes confirmed the views of commentators writing before the
judgment that the drafting history of section 1 evinced a legislative
intention that the provision be strictly interpreted to the benefit of rightsclaimants.35 Moreover, although Oakes stated that “the nature of the
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances”36 the test
in Oakes itself was framed in abstract terms which did not invite courts
to differentiate its application in future appeals that might differ
radically from Oakes itself, either with respect to the rights at play or the
policy context.
But Oakes was followed less than ten months later by R. v. Edwards
Books & Art Ltd.,37 in which superficially, the Court invoked and
applied Oakes as precedent. But notwithstanding that Dickson C.J.
wrote both judgments, Edwards Books was radically different. The key
shifts concerned the rational connection and minimal impairment
components of the proportionality analysis. Since Oakes had interpreted

32

Id., at 136.
Id., at 137.
34
L.E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” (1988)
10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 492. For a similar but critical view of the implications of the strictness of
Oakes, see P.A. Chapman, “The Politics of Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” (1986) O.H.L.J. 867.
35
T.J. Christian, “The Limitation of Liberty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms” (1982) 16 U.B.C. L. Rev. 105, at 107; W.E. Conklin, “Interpreting and
Applying The Limitations Clause; An Analysis of Section 1” (1982) 4 S.C.L.R. 75, at 81 to 82.
36
Oakes, supra, note 1, at 139.
37
[1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [hereinafter “Edwards Books”].
33
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the requirement of fit between means and ends to preclude legislative
over-inclusion, it was thought that the same would apply to problems of
legislative under-inclusion. Edwards Books presented two such gaps
between legislative ends and means, because notwithstanding the broad
goal of providing a common pause day, the legislation only applied to
the retail sector, and, even there, contained significant exceptions. But
the Court responded by justifying the limited scope of the legislation,
suggesting that a legislature could restrict its efforts to sectors “in which
there appear to be particularly urgent concerns or to constituencies that
seem especially needy”, and, more generally, that “[l]egislative choices
regarding alternative forms of business regulation … need not be tuned
with great precision in order to withstand judicial scrutiny”, since
“[s]implicity and administrative convenience are legitimate concerns”.38
Now the obvious question was why the same kinds of arguments could
not have been deployed in Oakes itself, given the obvious utility of
reverse onuses to the effectiveness of criminal prosecution. But
Edwards Books neither explicitly disapproved of Oakes nor explained
why it should operate so differently in this context.
And the same sorts of questions arose from the Court’s minimal
impairment analysis. Again, without explicit acknowledgment, the
Court modified Oakes, stipulating that the challenged measure need
only impair Charter rights “as little as is reasonably possible” and
asking “whether there is some reasonable alternative scheme”, as
opposed to whether the measure chosen was the least intrusive one
available.39 The Court wrestled openly with the various trade-offs
involved in alternatives to the Sunday closing law. Thus, the Court
reasoned that an employee’s right to refuse work on Sundays would fall
prey to “the subtle coercive pressure which an employer can exert on an
employee”.40 A complete exemption for retailers who could demonstrate
“a sincerely held religious belief requiring them to close their stores on a
day other than Sunday”41 was also undesirable. It would mean that
employees in the retail sector — a particularly vulnerable group —
would have little realistic option but to work on Sundays, and the
legislature was entitled to give priority to employee interests in
observing a common pause day over the commercial interests of
38
39
40
41

Id., at 772.
Id., at 772.
Id., at 773.
Id., at 773.
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employers. Moreover, the exemption would require a distasteful stateconducted inquiry into religious beliefs, and again, the state was entitled
to prefer a scheme which was less comprehensive but which avoided
such a process. And in addition to reasons particular to the appeal,
Edwards Books stated more generally that “[t]he courts are not called
upon to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones”, that “[b]y its
nature, legislation must, to some degree, cut across individual
circumstances in order to establish general rules”, and that deference
was mandated lest the Charter “simply become an instrument of better
situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the
improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons”.42 Although
the Court did not reach the minimal impairment stage of the
proportionality analysis in Oakes, once again, the question raised by
Edwards Books was why similar factors were not even signalled by the
Court just a few months earlier.
Academic commentators quickly noted that something was afoot.43
Robin Elliot observed that when “Oakes was delivered, the decision
appeared to settle what had become a vexing and very important
question — how was s. 1 of the Charter to be applied?”, but that
Edwards Books made it abundantly clear “that the Court is far from ad
idem on the matter of how s. 1 is to be applied”.44 Although Oakes
purported to be “comprehensive in scope”, Elliot presciently suggested
that “[t]he prospect that we will see a single, uniform approach to s. 1
emerging from the Court in the foreseeable future is dim indeed”.45
Andrew Petter and Patrick Monahan went even further, arguing that
“judges have recoiled from all but the formal trappings of the Oakes
test”.46 The net result was that the Court “still has the stringent Oakes
test sitting on the shelf waiting to be dusted off for use at an appropriate
moment … any time that the Court wants to strike down a law”, but

42

Id., at 782, 777, and 779.
But compare A.C. Hutchison, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at, 50-55, and J. Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional
Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), at 27-30, who emphasize
the indeterminacy of the Oakes test, a view which would seem to minimize the differences between
Edwards Books and Oakes.
44
R.M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — the Erosion of the
Common Front” (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 277, at 339.
45
Id., at 340.
46
A.J. Petter & P.J. Monahan, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1986-87 Term”
(1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 61, at 66.
43
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“[o]n the other hand when they are dealing a law with which they are
relatively sympathetic, the Court is able to step aside and basically allow
the legislature to do what it wants”.47
Clearly, the Court needed to explain exactly how Oakes and
Edwards Books fit together. And the scholarly literature offered some
preliminary suggestions. Elliot suggested, for example, that the strict
approach to rational connection in Oakes may have flowed from the
consequence of over-inclusion — “that innocent people might be
convicted of a serious criminal offence”.48 Presumably, the stakes were
somewhat lower in Edwards Books, which arose outside the criminal
context. Along a similar vein, Petter and Monahan astutely observed
that the Court was far less deferential in its criminal Charter cases than
in the non-criminal context, and that while “the cases in which the
Court’s rhetoric and reasons have been most deferential have all been
non-criminal cases … the Court has continued to operate on the basis of
the paradigm developed in its early cases” in the criminal law area.49
The rationale for this pattern of decisions, they suggested, might flow
from the Court’s assessment that “[s]upervision of the criminal process
is a staple item on the judicial menu”, and the Court is able in these
cases “to maintain the illusion that the judiciary is choosing between the
state and the individual rather than between the competing interests of
individuals or groups”, whereas the non-criminal cases raised “broad
issues of social policy” where “the trade-offs inherent in rights litigation
are more visible”.50
The Court offered a partial response to these academic criticisms
(albeit without citing them) in Irwin Toy and subsequent cases. To some
extent, the Court simply continued the unannounced yet transparent
trend toward deference by adopting less stringent interpretations of the
first two steps of the Oakes test in almost every case that came before
it.51 The need for a “pressing and substantial objective” that furthered
the values of a free and democratic society set out in Oakes was quietly
replaced with the less demanding requirement that the objective merely
47

Id., at 95.
R.M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — the Erosion of the
Common Front”, supra, note 44, at 318.
49
A.J. Petter & P.J. Monahan, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1986-87 Term”,
supra, note 46, at 68-69.
50
Id., at 69.
51
R.M. Elliot, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1989-90 Term”, supra, note 21,
at 139-144.
48
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be “valid”52 or “sufficiently important”.53 Indeed, given that Oakes and
Edwards Books both failed to connect the objectives of the challenged

52
53

R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3.
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”].
However, some more recent decisions point to a more demanding application of this
requirement of the Oakes test. In R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, 2001
SCC 70 [hereinafter “Advance Cutting”], the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the unique
system of collective bargaining which governs the Quebec construction industry. Employers can
only hire workers who hold a competency certificate, and the regime grants five unions the
monopoly to issue these certificates. In order to obtain a certificate, legislation requires that a
worker join one of these five legislatively recognized unions. Moreover, the legislation establishes
regional quotas as to the maximum number of certificates that can be issued. The majority argued
that the purpose underlying this regime was to bring industrial peace to the construction industry,
and that the means chosen met the test of proportionality. The dissenting judges (per Bastarache J.)
rejected this objective, on the basis that Oakes mandated reviewing courts to consider “the
objective of the legislation as it stands today”, as opposed to the historical reasons for which it was
enacted (at para. 45). Justice Bastarache then went on to reject two contemporary objectives for the
legislation — “to have structured collective bargaining and to provide for competency
requirements” — because he could not accept “that these are the true objectives of the legislation”
(at para. 46). Justice Bastarache then found no rational connection between the mandatory union
membership and regional quotas and the legislation’s purported objectives. What was missing from
his analysis is what he considered the true objectives to actually be, and how these objectives fared
under Oakes. A plausible way of reading the judgment is that Bastarache J. considered the true
objective underlying the challenged measures to be to accord a monopoly to a limited number of
construction unions and to restrict the supply of construction workers in exchange for labour peace,
and that this objective was insufficiently important under Oakes. The legislation, in other words,
was a form of illegitimate special-interest legislation which protected the interests of five
construction unions from economic competition for no offsetting public interest.
Figueroa v. Canada, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, 2003 SCC 37 [hereinafter “Figueroa”], likewise
can be read in a similar way. Under challenge there was a 50-candidate threshold for political
parties to be registered. Registered political parties possess the right to issue tax receipts for
donations received outside the election period, and to extend to candidates the right to transfer
unspent election funds to the party. Moreover, candidates of registered parties can include their
party affiliation on an election ballot. The Court found no rational connection between these
measures and the purported objectives underlying the scheme: to improve the effectiveness of the
electoral process, to protect the integrity of the electoral financing regime, and to increase the
possibility of a stable Parliament. The Court’s failure to find a rational connection, of course,
suggests that the true objective may have been rather different — to protect larger political parties
from electoral competition to the detriment of the public interest. And Figueroa can be read as
holding that that objective cannot justify a limitation on s. 3. In other words, Figueroa holds that
the Charter will prohibit democratic lock-ups.
In addition, the Court has recently reaffirmed its earlier precedents that discriminatory
objectives (Big M) and fiscal considerations (Singh, B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference) are
insufficiently important to justify the limitation of Charter rights: Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J.
No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter “Vriend”], L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissenting reasons in
Nova Scotia v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 [hereinafter “Walsh”]
(discriminatory objectives) and Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova
Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (fiscal
considerations). But the Court has left open the door to fiscal emergencies counting as a legitimate
reason to limit Charter rights: Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] S.C.J. No. 61,
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 381.
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measures in those appeals to the values of a free and democratic society,
this move hardly came as a surprise. Similarly, the need for careful
legislative design to minimize the possibility of over- and underinclusion at the rational connection stage — applied by Oakes, but then
diluted by Edwards Books — was replaced with the much less onerous
requirement that the means chosen simply further the legislative
objective.54
But it was principally the development of the minimal impairment
test which drove the jurisprudence. Here, the Court explicitly
acknowledged that it had departed, and would continue to depart, from
the strictness of Oakes. Yet rather than adopting an across-the-board
demobilization in every case — as it had with respect to the first two
stages of the Oakes test — it instead attempted to draw a series of
categorical distinctions to identify cases in which it should defer under
section 1, asking only whether it could be said that the government had
a “reasonable basis”55 for concluding that it had impaired the right as
little as possible, and those where it should not.56 The Court relied on a
diverse set of criteria which often overlapped in individual cases,
providing multiple grounds for deference.57
54
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2
S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter “Rocket”]. Also see P.W. Hogg, “Section 1 Revisited” (1992) 1 N.J.C.L. 1.
However, in three recent sets of cases, the Court has moved away from the deferential,
“minimal rationality” view of the rational connection test and taken a stricter approach: (a)
situations of legislative omission or under-inclusion, where the exclusion of rights-claimants from a
legislative regime according benefits has been held to bear no rational connection to the goals of the
scheme as a whole: M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 and L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s
dissenting reasons in Walsh; (b) cases where the means chosen would actually cause the mischief
the legislation seeks to cure: see the dissenting reasons of Cory and Iacobucci JJ. in Delisle v.
Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R 989, and the concurring
reasons of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 [hereinafter “Dunmore”]; and (c) cases involving the restriction of the right to
vote guaranteed by s. 3, where the means are only intelligible on the basis of assumptions that
communicate a lack of respect for democracy: Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002]
S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 [hereinafter “Sauvé”]. This development warrants more in-depth
analysis than I can provide here, particularly given that the “minimal rationality” version of the
rational connection test is still routinely used by the Court.
55
Irwin Toy, supra, note 18, at 994.
56
A. Lokan, “The Rise and Fall of Doctrine Under Section 1 of the Charter” (1992) 24
Ottawa L. Rev. 163.
57
For an early prediction that this would happen, see N. Finkelstein, “Section 1: The
Standard for Assessing Restrictive Government Actions and the Charter’s Code of Procedure and
Evidence” (1983-4) 9 Queen’s L.J. 143. For a puzzling analysis of the 11 years of s. 1 case law
subsequent to Oakes that omits detailed discussion of these doctrinal distinctions, see L.E.
Trakman, W. Cole-Hamilton & S. Gatien, “R. v. Oakes 1986-1997: Back to the Drawing Board”
(1998) 36 O.H.L.J. 83.
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One strategy was to differentiate different policy areas based on
comparative institutional advantage or relative judicial expertise. Thus,
in Irwin Toy, the Court indicated it would not defer in the criminal
justice context, or, for that matter, whenever “the government’s purpose
relates to maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judicial
system”, because of its “accumulated experience in dealing with such
questions”.58 Indeed, the judiciary is a central government actor in the
criminal justice system. By contrast, the Court lacks relative expertise
vis-à-vis other branches of government in other contexts, for example,
labour relations or commercial regulation. This distinction explained the
Court’s differing approaches in Oakes (a criminal law case) and
Edwards Books (which concerned the regulation of the retail industry).
It also accounted for the Court’s subsequent deference under section 1
in two decisions arising in the labour relations context, McKinney v.
University of Guelph59 and Advance Cutting, where the Court extended
its historic deference to labour boards and arbitrators to legislatively-set
labour policy — and in the latter case, the unique need to secure labour
peace in the Quebec construction sector.
A second strategy was to differentiate cases according to the
competing interests at stake, on the theory that both the range and
relative weight of different interests should guide the Court’s choice of
standard. On one reading, Irwin Toy’s criminal versus non-criminal
distinction was a proxy for this underlying set of considerations. Thus,
in the criminal law context, the state is “the singular antagonist” of the
rights-claimant, where the state acts “on behalf of the whole
community”.60 By contrast, in other situations, the state attempts to
mediate “competing claims among different groups”.61 The claim here is
that when the state acts on behalf of third parties whose interests are
opposed to those of the rights-claimant, the interests of these individuals
are a legitimate counter-weight to the rights of Charter-claimants. The
idea is that some successful Charter claims have real costs for important
interests of identifiable individuals whom the state acts to protect.
Enforcing the Charter is therefore not costless in real human terms —
rights claims are redistributive, producing winners and losers.
Constitutional adjudication is a form of interest-balancing which is
58
59
60
61

Irwin Toy, supra, note 18, at 994.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter “McKinney”].
Irwin Toy, supra, note 18, at 994.
Id., at 993.
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difficult to distinguish in many cases from legislative decision-making,
counselling deference. By contrast, when the state promotes the interests
of the “community”, successful claims apparently do not impose the
same costs, and the balance is more heavily tilted in favour of the rightsclaimant. Criminal justice falls into the former category, while social
and economic policy into the latter. Edwards Books, McKinney and
Advance Cutting can be explained as cases in which the Court deferred
on the presence of competing interests, and Oakes as a case in which the
lack of deference is attributable to the absence of competing interests.
This strategy generated a number of variations. For example, the
Court reasoned that the interests of third parties count even more as a
reason for deference when the third parties are vulnerable groups to
whose interests the state grants priority, or whom the state protects.62
Thus, the Court has deferred when legislation protects employees
(Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson),63 or at least those who are
“low-skilled, non-union and poorly educated” (Edwards Books),64 and
children (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe).65 Arguably, although not explicitly
invoked, this consideration can also explain the Court’s deference to
measures which it described as protecting the interests of members of
racial and religious minorities (R. v. Keegstra)66 and women (R. v.
Butler67).68 Another strand of this line of analysis was to focus on
interest balancing in the context of the allocation of scarce public

62
R. Colker, “Section 1, Contextuality, and the Anti-Disadvantage Principle” (1992) 42
U.T.L.J. 77. It also follows that when legislation disadvantages members of a vulnerable group,
then the Court should show less deference under s. 1. Arguably, this position was adopted and
applied by the Court in U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada, [1999] S.C.J. No. 44, [1999] 2
S.C.R. 1083 [hereinafter “KMart”], where the Court refused to defer to a legislative prohibition on
secondary protection, inter alia, because (at para. 68) “those who are subject to the legislative
restriction … form a vulnerable group in Canadian society”. Also see: L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s
dissenting reasons in Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609; Cory and
Iacobucci’s JJ.’s joint dissent in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No.
43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989; McLachlin C.J.’s dissenting reasons in Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J.
No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 [hereinafter “Lavoie”].
63
[1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
64
Edwards Books, supra, note 37, at 778.
65
[2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [hereinafter “Sharpe”].
66
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter “Keegstra”].
67
[1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter “Butler”].
68
In addition, members of the Court have suggested that smokers, who tend to be “the
young and the less educated”, should also be regarded as a vulnerable group (RJR-MacDonald,
supra, note 22, at para. 66 (per La Forest J.)), as should consumers of cigarettes, because “the
sophistication of advertising campaigns … creates an enormous power differential between these
companies and tobacco consumers” (RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 22, at para. 76).
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resources, a situation alluded to by Irwin Toy itself. Thus, in McKinney,
a reason offered by the Court for rejecting the constitutional challenge
to a university’s mandatory retirement policies was that one reason for
mandatory retirement was to give universities flexibility in distributing
scarce resources among faculty “to enhance and maintain their capacity
to seek and maintain excellence”.69 McKinney also introduced the muchcriticized doctrine of incrementalism, whereby scarce resources counted
as a reason to defer, so as to permit the legislature to “deal with
problems one step at a time” as opposed to obliging it “to deal with all
aspects of a problem at once”.70 The most infamous application of this
doctrine was Sopinka J.’s concurring judgment in Egan v. Canada,71 in
which he held that the denial of old age security to same sex couples
was minimally impairing because “equating same-sex couples with
heterosexual spouses, either married or common law, is still regarded as
a novel concept”.72 A final variation on this approach was to elevate the
interests of third parties to the constitutional level, so that the state can
be seen as protecting their Charter rights by limiting the Charter rights
of others. So Keegstra can be understood as a case in which legislation
protected the rights to freedom of expression of racial and religious
minorities by protecting them from the harm of silencing, and Edwards
Books a case where Sunday closing legislation protected the right to
freedom of religion of Sunday-observing retail employees.
A third strategy, which flowed from the second, was to downgrade
the importance of the constitutional right at stake. Just as the interests of
third parties might counter-balance the claims of rights-claimants, the
latter might be easier to outweigh if they are less important. The Court
developed this approach from the purposive approach to rightsinterpretation set out in Big M, in which the interpretation of the scope
of a Charter right proceeds from an account of the interests it is meant to
protect. The Court reasoned that since some protected activity bore an
attenuated connection to these interests, it warranted less constitutional
protection. This line of analysis was developed principally in the context
of freedom of expression, where the Court distinguished between core
and peripheral expression. The interests underlying section 2(b) are the
search for the truth, participation in social and political decision69
70
71
72

McKinney, supra, note 59, at 286.
Id., at 317-18.
[1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter “Egan”].
Id., at 576. This aspect of Egan was overruled by the Court in Vriend, supra, note 53.
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making, and individual self-fulfillment. The Court reasoned that
commercial expression (Irwin Toy,73 Rocket, Prostitution Reference,
Butler), hate speech (Keegstra, Canada (Human Rights Commission) v.
Taylor,74 Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15),75 defamation
(Hill v. Church of Scientology,76 R. v. Lucas)77 and sexually explicit
expression (Butler, Sharpe, Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v.
Canada)78 are peripheral to the interests protected by section 2(b) and
accordingly trigger deference under section 1. By implication, political
speech lies at the core of section 2(b) (Thomson Newspapers, Harper)
and laws which restrict it do not warrant any deference. The commercial
character of operating a retail establishment on Sunday also appeared to
lead the Court in Edwards Books to treat the rights-claim as being of
lesser value.
This elaborate set of categories and distinctions shaped the culture
of constitutional argument for many years. But it has generated a
number of problems. The first was that the Court has not followed its
own schemas. In particular, notwithstanding Irwin Toy, it deferred in
criminal law cases. Perhaps the most vivid examples are a series of
appeals in which the Court turned back constitutional challenges to
reverse onus provisions, notwithstanding that it had struck down such a
provision in Oakes. In R. v. Chaulk,79 the Court upheld the presumption
that an accused is presumed sane until the contrary was proved, and, in
so doing, applied not Oakes but Edwards Books. Indeed, it actually
extended Edwards Books, by clarifying that the question under minimal
impairment was whether a less intrusive means was available that
“would achieve the same objective as effectively” as the measure under
challenge.80 Although the Court cited Irwin Toy, it did not refer to the
distinction it drew between criminal and non-criminal matters, let alone
attempt to apply it. Justice Iacobucci’s concurrence in the confusing set
of judgments in R. v. Wholesale Travel81 takes a similar approach. But

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
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81

As read by the Supreme Court in Rocket, supra, note 54, at 251.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892.
[1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.
[1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.
[1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439.
[2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 139, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 [hereinafter “Chaulk”].
Id., at 1341.
[1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154.
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perhaps the most startling judgment is R. v. Downey,82 in which the
Court upheld a reverse onus provision largely identical to the one which
was challenged in Oakes — that presumed living off the avails of
prostitution from the fact of living with a prostitute. Not surprisingly,
McLachlin J. in dissent argued that Oakes meant that the law was
unconstitutional because it was over-inclusive. But the majority —
without even citing Irwin Toy — baldly stated that “Parliament is not
required to choose the absolutely least intrusive alternative”.83
More recently, the Court has not deferred in cases in which it was
clearly faced with legislation which balanced conflicting economic
interests. Consider M. v. H. Although the Court acknowledged that it
should defer “where the impugned legislation involves the balancing of
claims of competing groups”, it concluded that “[t]his is not such a
case”, since “no group will be disadvantaged by granting members of
same-sex couples access to … spousal support”.84 But while it is true
that extending the spousal support regime to same sex couples does not
harm the interests of opposite sex couples, it does affect the economic
dynamics and balance of power within same sex relationships. Indeed,
precisely for that reason, H. opposed M.’s constitutional challenge.
Another example is Dunmore. The Court appeared to reason that since
deference was warranted where the legislature acts on behalf of a
vulnerable group, no deference is required when the legislature is
balancing the interests of two different vulnerable groups — in
Dunmore, family farmers and agricultural workers. However, even if
there were vulnerable groups on both sides of the equation — such that
vulnerability came off the table as a reason for deference — on Irwin
Toy, the existence of competing interests alone is a reason for
deference.85 Indeed, in this respect, it is hard to square Dunmore’s lack
of deference with McKinney and Advance Cutting.86
But perhaps a more serious problem which emerged is that the
distinctions drawn by the Court were untenable. This became most
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[1992] S.C.J. No. 48, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10.
Id., at 37.
84
M. v. H., supra, note 54, at para. 126.
85
However, compare Auton v. British Columbia, [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, 2004 SCC 78,
where the Court misapplied s. 15 arguably because it did not wish to enter the hornet’s nest of
resource allocation in health care.
86
KMart, supra, note 62, is arguably different, because of the presence of the public
interest in freedom of expression in the context of secondary picketing.
83

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Proportionality Analysis

517

apparent in the context of freedom of expression.87 Recall that the Court
had classified political expression as core expression worthy of the
highest level of constitutional protection. It became quickly apparent
that expression which the Court had classified as peripheral was
arguably political in character. Indeed, debates over how to classify
expression were central to the doctrinal politics of each appeal. In
Butler, for example, the intervener British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association argued that since “sexual norms, behaviours and identities
have a bearing on the structure of political life”, sexually explicit
expression was in fact a form of political expression.88 This claim has
been most forcefully advanced by sexual minorities, who argue that
dominant portrayals of sexuality are part and parcel of a culture of
discrimination. This view was at the heart of the submissions made by
the appellants and the interveners LEAF and EGALE in Little Sisters.
And an even clearer example is hate speech, whose political character is
hard to dispute, notwithstanding its odious content.89 Indeed, the
disagreement between the majority and dissent and Keegstra largely
turned on whether hate speech should be understood as political
expression — and hence as lying at the core of section 2(b). As
McLachlin J. wrote in dissent, “[e]xperience shows that in actual cases
it may be difficult to draw the line between speech which has value to
democracy or social issues and speech which does not.”90
Even in the commercial speech context, McLachlin J.’s plurality
judgment in RJR-MacDonald offered rather qualified support for the
Court’s earlier statements in Butler and the Prostitution Reference
regarding the peripheral nature of advertising. Thus, she stated that it
was “arguably less important than some forms of speech” and “may be
easier to justify than other infringements”, and then proceeded to
explain the positive value to consumers of tobacco advertising,
emphasizing that commercial speech in general “should not be lightly
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For a useful overview, see K. Roach & D. Schneiderman, “Freedom of Expression in
Canada” in G.-A. Beaudoin & E. Mendes, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th
ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005), at 257-323.
88
L. Gotell, “Shaping Butler: The New Politics of Anti-Pornography” in B. Cossman et
al., Bad Attitude/s on Trial: Pornography, Feminism and the Butler Decision (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1997) 48, at 76.
89
S. Braun, Democracy Off Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate Propaganda Law
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
90
Keegstra, supra, note 66, at 842.
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dismissed”.91 Justice LeBel in R. v. Guignard92 went even further, and
recognized “the substantial value” of commercial expression because of
“the very nature of our economic system, which is based on the
existence of the free market” and “[t]he orderly operation of that market
depends on businesses and consumers having access to abundant and
diverse information”.93 Finally, the Court has refused to accord less
constitutional protection to economically motivated expression in the
labour relations context, in a pair of decisions on secondary picketing,
KMart and R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages
(West).94 The fact that economic interests motivate picketing by
employees did not warrant deference, because working conditions and
terms of employment “inform one’s identity, emotional health, and
sense of self-worth” and “may impact on the personal lives of workers
even outside their working hours”.95
And even if one brackets the problem of how to categorize different
kinds of expression, another problem arises. In several cases involving
restrictions on freedom of expression, the considerations on the question
of deference point in opposite directions. On the one hand, certain kinds
of speech have been criminalized with the possibility of imprisonment,
and therefore on Irwin Toy attract the highest standard of review under
section 1. But on the other hand, the speech in many cases has been
peripheral, which argues for deference. Thus, the peripheral nature of
sexually explicit expression was acknowledged in Butler and Sharpe,
and of hate speech in Keegstra, as a reason for deference. Likewise, in
the Prostitution Reference, Dickson C.J. stated that “[i]t can hardly be
said that communications regarding an economic transaction of sex for
money lie at, or even near, the core of the guarantee of freedom of
expression”,96 and deferred for that reason. So too in Butler, in which the
Court reasoned that “the fact that the targeted material is expression
which is motivated, in the overwhelming majority of cases, by economic
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RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 22, at paras. 170, 171 and 170 (emphasis added).
[2002] S.C.J. No. 16, 2002 SCC 14.
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Id., at para. 21. For an early criticism of the positive value attached by the Court to
commercial expression, see D. Schneiderman, “Consumer Interests and Commercial Speech: A
Comment on RJR-McDonald v. Canada (A.G.)” (1996) 30 U.B.C. L. Rev. 165.
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[2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156. Strictly speaking, this was a common law
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profit”97 reinforced the case for deference. But in none of these cases did
the Court acknowledge the fact that the criminal nature of the
prohibition counted against deference, let alone provide any additional
criteria to sort out the conflict between the guidance provided by its
previous case law. This is all the more bizarre given that Irwin Toy itself
raised this problem, because it involved the regulation of commercial
speech (warranting deference) through a regime that created criminal
sanctions, including imprisonment (warranting no deference), albeit
through provincial law.
The difficulties raised by Keegstra, the Prostitution Reference,
Butler, Sharpe, and Irwin Toy itself point to perhaps the most
fundamental problem of all — the distinction between criminal law and
other areas of public policy as a determinant of deference. The case in
which the Court squarely faced this problem was RJR-MacDonald, in
which restrictions on tobacco advertising were backed up by criminal
sanctions. But as judges in both the majority and dissent noted, the
legislation also balanced competing interests, as opposed to simply
setting up the state as the singular antagonist of the individual. Justice
La Forest listed the relevant interests who expressed views during the
legislative deliberations surrounding the adoption of the challenged
legislation: “medicine, transport, advertising, smokers’ rights, nonsmokers’ rights, and tobacco production”.98 Justice La Forest famously
deferred in his dissent, and obviously viewed the criminal character of
the legislation as not dispositive. Even though McLachlin J. did not
defer, she acknowledged the fundamental challenge that understanding
the legislation as simultaneously criminal and as balancing competing
interests posed for Irwin Toy. “Such distinctions may not always be easy
to apply”, she observed, since “the criminal law is generally seen as
involving a contest between the state and the accused, but it also
involves an allocation of priorities between the accused and the victim,
actual or potential”.99 In other words, since crimes are not victimless,
criminal laws necessarily and inescapably balance the competing
interests of victims and the accused. Indeed, one could push this line of
analysis even one step further, and argue that in many cases, the
criminal law is a form of protective legislation which is designed to

97
98
99

Butler, supra, note 67, at 501.
RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 22, at para. 70.
Id., at para. 135.
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protect vulnerable groups, and, indeed, the Charter interests (e.g., bodily
integrity) of those groups. Perhaps the leading examples are sexual
offences, the victims of which are overwhelmingly women and children.
The failure of the Court to appreciate these points in R. v. Seaboyer,100 R.
v. O’Connor,101 and R. v. Daviault102 led Parliament in legislative replies
to highlight these facts, clearly with a view to directing the Court to
defer in future constitutional challenges.103
So in sum, the dominant narrative of the legacy of Oakes is the rise
and collapse of simple, dichotomous categorizations meant to help the
Court to calibrate the degree of deference according to the particular
100

[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 [hereinafter “Seaboyer”].
[1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 [hereinafter “O’Connor”].
102
[1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 [hereinafter “Daviault”].
103
The reply to Seaboyer, supra, note 100, and O’Connor, supra, note 101, Bill C-46, S.C.
1997, c. 30, opened its preamble with the following passages:
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada continues to be gravely concerned about the
incidence of sexual violence and abuse in Canadian society and, in particular, the
prevalence of sexual violence against women and children;
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada recognizes that violence has a particularly
disadvantageous impact on the equal participation of women and children in society and on
the rights of women and children to security of the person, privacy and equal benefit of the
law as guaranteed by sections 7, 8, 15 and 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms;
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada intends to promote and help to ensure the full
protection of the rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for all,
including those who are accused of, and those who are or may be victims of, sexual
violence or abuse;
WHEREAS the rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are
guaranteed equally to all and, in the event of a conflict, those rights are to be accommodated
and reconciled to the greatest extent possible;
Bill C-72, S.C. 1995, c. 32, the reply to Daviault, contained similar language in its
preamble:
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada recognizes that violence has a particularly
disadvantaging impact on the equal participation of women and children in society and on
the rights of women and children to security of the person and to the equal protection and
benefit of the law as guaranteed by sections 7, 15 and 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms;
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada recognizes that there is a close association between
violence and intoxication and is concerned that self-induced intoxication may be used
socially and legally to excuse violence, particularly violence against women and children;
…
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada desires to promote and help to ensure the full
protection of the rights guaranteed under sections 7, 11, 15 and 28 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms for all Canadians, including those who are or may be victims of
violence …
For commentary on Bill C-72 which emphasizes the importance of the preamble to future
constitutional litigation, see I. Grant, “Second Chances: Bill C-72 and the Charter” (1996) 30
O.H.L.J. 379.
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features of each case. An interesting piece of supporting evidence is that
in recent jurisprudence we only rarely see the quotation of the famous
passage in Irwin Toy, whereas it was commonplace for the entire passage
to be reproduced in the years immediately following that judgment, as a
kind of Rosetta Stone for section 1. If we had to date the death of the
categorical approach to section 1, it would be with Thomson Newspapers
in 1998. In that case, a majority of the Court agreed with McLachlin J.’s
scepticism towards Irwin Toy’s categorical distinction between criminal
and non-criminal legislation, and went further, stating that “nothing …
suggests that there is one category of cases in which a lower standard of
justification under s. 1 is applied, and another category in which a higher
standard is applied”.104 But although the categories have collapsed, they
have survived as factors which direct, but do not determine, the judicial
approach in individual cases. And so Thomson Newspapers recasts many
of the categorical distinctions developed by the Court as factors to be
weighed and balanced, without any clear criteria as to their relationship
and relative priority. The result is a highly context-driven inquiry.
Categories, unsuccessful on their own terms, have paved the way for
context as the new touchstone of section 1.

III. THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE
The dominant narrative makes sense of much of the last 20 years of
working with Oakes. But it misses out on another legacy of Oakes,
which is of equal and increasing importance.
This counter-narrative begins with Oakes itself. In many ways, the
centrality of Oakes to the Court’s evolving experience with the Charter
is puzzling, given the procedural history of the case. As Robert Sharpe
and Kent Roach tell us in Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey,105 Oakes
came before the Court as a garden variety criminal appeal. The lower
court litigation gave no hint of the enormous importance of the case, and
so, not surprisingly, no Attorneys-General intervened. Moreover, since
the Court had not determined in advance of the hearing that this would
be the case in which it set out the test for section 1, and the Court’s own
stance on the role of interveners in Charter cases was still in its infancy
and a topic of considerable internal debate, the question of scheduling a
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Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 24, at para. 90.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), at 332-36.
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re-hearing and inviting intervener submissions on this very point did not
even arise.106 And so it was left to the parties to present arguments to the
Court. But to the extent that the parties addressed questions of
constitutional method, they focused largely on the interpretation of
section 11(d), since this was also the first case concerning that
provision. They devoted minimal attention to the methodological
question of how section 1 should be interpreted. The hearing likewise
focused on section 11(d). And even in the post-hearing conference,
section 1 was not an issue. It was only later that Dickson C.J. decided to
tackle section 1, working closely with his clerks (Joel Bakan and
Colleen Sheppard) and Executive Legal Officer (Jim McPherson).
Against this procedural backdrop, and with 20 years of hindsight, it
is questionable whether the Court was wise to strike out as boldly as it
did in Oakes.107 For in addition to setting up a stringent test of
justification, Oakes also made empirics central to every stage of the
Oakes test. As the Court said in a largely ignored passage:
Where evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements
of a s. 1 inquiry, and this will generally be the case, it should be cogent
and persuasive and make clear to the Court the consequences of
imposing or not imposing the limit.108

This passage appears to have been largely overlooked in the
academic literature. Moreover, it has been quoted infrequently by the
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Compare the Court’s later approach in R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1
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parties only. After the initial hearing was held (on 26 January 1996), the judges decided that they
needed a re-hearing with the benefit of submissions from interveners, I suspect because
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Court — only in four Charter cases,109 whereas Oakes has been cited by
the Court in 152 subsequent judgments.110 But it is becoming
increasingly central to the Court’s jurisprudence. The justice most
responsible for bringing the Court’s attention to this issue has been
McLachlin C.J. As she explained in RJR-MacDonald, the Oakes test
sets up a process of “reasoned demonstration”, as opposed to simply
accepting the say-so of governments.111 By this, she meant that “[t]he s.
1 inquiry is by its very nature a fact-specific inquiry”.112 As she
continued:
In determining whether the objective of the law is sufficiently
important to be capable of overriding a guaranteed right, the court
must examine the actual objective of the law. In determining
proportionality, it must determine the actual connection between the
objective and what the law will in fact achieve; the actual degree to
which it impairs the right; and whether the actual benefit which the
law is calculated to achieve outweighs the actual seriousness of the
limitation of the right. In short, s. 1 is an exercise based on the facts of
the law at issue and the proof offered of its justification, not on
abstractions.113

Later on, in Sauvé, McLachlin C.J. built upon these themes. She
held that governments seeking to justify the denial of the right to vote to
prisoners under section 1 cannot rely on “vague and symbolic
objectives”, such as inculcating respect for the rule of law.114 Rather,
rights can only be justifiably limited in response to concrete, precise and
real problems or harms whose existence can be demonstrated to the
satisfaction of a court through the normal trial process.
Needless to say, in Oakes itself, no such factual record was before
the Court, because the parties had no notice that they were required to
produce one. To understand why Oakes may have been unwise, imagine
if the Crown had known the requirements of the Oakes test in advance
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and attempted to adduce evidence sufficient to justify the challenged
provision. Would it have been possible to provide evidence meeting the
civil standard of proof mandated by Oakes with respect to each
constituent element of the test? In particular, would it have been
possible to definitely prove that the means chosen minimally impaired
the right to be presumed innocent — i.e., that other less intrusive means
would not have been equally effective? Indeed, what kind of proof
would have sufficed? The conundrum raised by this hypothetical is in
fact a more general problem that has emerged as a central feature of
Charter adjudication. Public policy is often based on approximations
and extrapolations from the available evidence, inferences from
comparative data, and, on occasion, even educated guesses. Absent a
large-scale policy experiment, this is all the evidence that is likely to be
available. Justice La Forest offered an observation in McKinney which
rings true: “[d]ecisions on such matters must inevitably be the product
of a mix of conjecture, fragmentary knowledge, general experience and
knowledge of the needs, aspirations and resources of society”.115
In other words, Oakes’ approach to interpreting section 1 has
unwittingly created a major institutional dilemma for the Court, given
the practical reality that public policy is often made on the basis of
incomplete knowledge. In many important cases, disputes over
justifiable limits on Charter rights have been factual disputes about the
nature of social problems, and the effectiveness of government policy
instruments in combating them. Although it has never been framed in
this way, the basic question in these cases is the same: who should bear
the risk of empirical uncertainty with respect to government activity that
infringes Charter rights? This has become one of the unarticulated yet
central questions in Charter litigation. It has given rise to an extensive
jurisprudence, and is one of the principal legacies of Oakes.
One answer would be that in a constitutional, rights-based regime,
in which rights are the rule and of presumptive importance, limitations
on rights are the exception, governments bear the onus of justification in
upholding rights-infringing measures, and the state bears the risk of
empirical uncertainty. But to set such a high bar for governments may
be to ask too much of them. It may simply be impossible to prove with
scientific certainty that the means chosen to combat the problem
actually will do so, and that other, less intrusive means to tackle the
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problem are equally effective. As La Forest J. wrote in his dissenting
judgment in RJR-MacDonald, to require governments to bear the risk of
empirical uncertainty “could have the effect of virtually paralyzing the
operation of government … it will be impossible to govern … it would
not be possible to make difficult but sometimes necessary legislative
choices. There would be conferred on the courts a supervisory role over
a state itself essentially inactive”.116 And so another answer would be for
the courts to not require governments to adduce much in the way of a
factual record at all. But this would seem to read out the requirement
that reasonable limits be “demonstrably justified”, set out in the text of
section 1 itself, and to ask courts to accept the say-so of governments on
the existence of public policy problems, and the relative efficacy of
policy instruments in dealing with them.
The Court has struck a compromise between these two extremes. In
cases in which there is conflicting or inconclusive social science
evidence, the question is whether the government has a “reasonable
basis” for concluding that an actual problem exists, that the means
chosen would address it, and that the means chosen infringes the right as
little as possible.117 This standard is understood as expecting something
less of governments than definitive, scientific proof. But an absolute
lack of evidence is unacceptable; there must be some factual basis for
the public policy.
A pair of examples explains how these principles have operated in
practice. In Irwin Toy, the Court upheld a Quebec statute prohibiting
advertising directed at children under 13 years of age, on the basis that
children were unable to distinguish fact from fiction and were
susceptible to manipulation. The evidence before the Court clearly
demonstrated that children between the ages of 2 and 6 could not
distinguish fact from fiction, whereas expert opinion was divided on at
what point between 7 and 13 years old “children generally develop the
cognitive ability to recognize the persuasive nature of advertising”.118
However, this evidence, albeit inconclusive, was enough for the Court.
As it said, the cut-off age of 13 was made “without access to complete
knowledge”, but as long as “the legislature has made a reasonable
assessment as to where the line is most properly drawn, especially if that
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assessment involves weighing conflicting scientific evidence … it is not
for the court to second guess. That would only substitute one estimate
for another”.119 Conversely, in Ford v. Quebec,120 the Court was faced
with a blanket requirement that commercial signage in Quebec only be
in French. The Court held that while the evidentiary record was
sufficient to demonstrate the importance of the government’s objective,
there was a complete absence of evidence on the critical question of
whether “the requirement of the use of French only is either necessary
for the achievement of the legislative objective or proportionate to it”.121
As a consequence, the Court found that the government had not met its
burden of justification under section 1.122
As Irwin Toy and Ford illustrate, the “reasonable basis” test has
largely been worked out in the context of cases on freedom of
expression. The Court has rejected conventional morality as an
acceptable justification for limiting free speech, opting instead for the
principle that speech can only be limited if it is harmful. Richard Moon
usefully terms this the “behavioural approach”, since it posits that
expression will encourage listeners to act in harmful ways.123 This
interpretive choice has had the unanticipated effect of locking the Court
into a search for evidence of the real, concrete harms of prohibited
speech. The difficulties this has created for the Court have come home
in its decisions on pornography and hate speech. Unable to rely on
morality-based justifications for these laws, the Court has been
confronted with the absence of definitive evidence demonstrating that
these forms of speech are harmful. Wayne Sumner has recently
reviewed the available empirical evidence, and concluded “that reliable
evidence of harm is relatively scarce”.124 So not surprisingly, the Court
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has had to alter the standard of proof. In three of its pornography
decisions (Butler, Sharpe, Little Sisters) the Court has been able to point
to some social science evidence, which satisfies the reasonable basis
test. And in cases on hate speech (Keegstra, Ross), where such evidence
was entirely absent, the Court has relied on “experience and common
sense”125 and “reason or logic”126 to bridge the empirical gap. Moreover,
common sense and logic were relied on in two of the pornography
decisions (Butler, Sharpe) as additional support for the conclusion that
the speech was harmful.127
Taken together, the Court terms this approach the “reasonable
apprehension of harm” test. But although the Court has been unanimous
in accepting the reasonable basis test to assess inconclusive social
science evidence, and in permitting governments to rely on common
sense or logic to surmount evidentiary gaps, there have been significant
disagreements in recent cases over the boundaries of these doctrines.
Significantly, these divisions on the Court have not turned on the sorts
of problems which arose out of the categorical distinctions which it
developed in Irwin Toy and other cases. For example, there is no
disagreement in these cases over how to categorize the speech in
question, or on whether to defer under minimal impairment.
So what is the basis of disagreement? In some cases, the
disagreement has centred on what kinds of inferences governments are
entitled to draw from inconclusive evidence. The most famous clash
occurred in RJR-MacDonald, and centred on the link between tobacco
advertising and consumption, given the absence of definitive evidence
linking the two. The Court divided on whether governments were
entitled to infer from the widespread use of “brand preference” and
“informational” advertising by tobacco companies that such a link
existed. Justice La Forest in dissent was willing to infer that by

work. In the absence of reliable evidence of harm, Sumner is led to the conclusion that Keegstra,
Taylor, Butler and Little Sisters and Sharpe were all wrongly decided.
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convincing smokers not to quit, these advertisements had the effect of
sustaining levels of consumption, while McLachlin J. refused to do so.128
And the Court has also split on the circumstances in which it is
appropriate to apply “logic” or “common sense” to surmount an absence
of evidence. What is particularly interesting is that the Court has divided
on this question in two cases concerning political expression, Thomson
Newspapers and Harper. From the vantage point of the categories of
deference set out in Irwin Toy and subsequent decisions, these were easy
cases, because political expression lies at the core of section 2(b), and is
a clear instance in which governments should be held to a strict standard
of review. But although the Court agreed that political speech was at
issue, it was nonetheless sharply divided over how to address the lack of
definitive proof for the factual premises underlying the challenged laws.
Although these cases have attracted minimal attention from
constitutional scholars for their broader importance to the Court’s
understanding of the judicial role under the Charter, they are worthy of
close attention because they tell us that there is another legacy of Oakes.
At the heart of the majority judgment in Thomson Newspapers was
the concern that too broad an approach to bridging empirical gaps
through judicial notice could undermine entirely the idea that
governments can only justifiably limit constitutional rights to respond to
real problems. The majority accordingly attempted to set some limits on
when it could accept the existence of harm without evidence. It
suggested that its common sense or logic approach to the existence of
harm applied to hate speech and pornography because “the possibility of
harm is within the everyday knowledge and experience of Canadians, or
where factual determination and value judgments overlap”.129 Thus the
majority refused to infer from the fact that opinion polls influence voter
choice in election campaigns that inaccurate polls mislead large
numbers of voters and have a significant impact on the outcome of an
election, “without more specific and conclusive evidence to that
effect”.130 It therefore found unconstitutional a publication ban on public
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opinion polls within the final three days of a federal election campaign.
The message was that pornography and hate speech were in a special
and narrow category.
But then in Harper, a divided Court disregarded this self-imposed
limitation, and upheld restrictions on third party expenditures during
election campaigns on the eve of the last federal vote. The justifications
for the restrictions were to further the value of political equality (to
equalize participation in political debate, to protect the outcome of an
election from being distorted by third party expenditures, and to
safeguard the public’s confidence in the electoral process) and to protect
the integrity of spending limits for candidates and political parties. The
majority openly acknowledged that both the alleged harm and the
efficacy of legislative responses to it were “difficult, if not impossible,
to measure scientifically”,131 but nonetheless was willing to reason both
that the harm existed and that the cure was effective. The dissent, led by
McLachlin C.J., argued that in the absence of evidence, “[t]he dangers
posited are entirely hypothetical” and “unproven and speculative” and
that “the legislation is an overreaction to a non-existent problem”, and
was completely unwilling to entertain the common sense argument.132
And these disagreements have now spilled over into cases outside
the context of freedom of expression. Consider Figueroa, which
concerned the right to vote protected by section 3. The Court
unanimously found unconstitutional the 50-candidate threshold for
federal political parties to be registered. Registered political parties
possess the right to issue tax receipts for donations received outside the
election period, and to extend to candidates the right to transfer unspent
election funds to the party. Moreover, candidates of registered parties
can include their party affiliation on an election ballot. For Iacobucci J.
(speaking for six members of the Court), an important consideration was
the lack of any evidence demonstrating a link between these measures
and two of the stated objectives underlying the scheme: to improve the
effectiveness of the electoral process, and to increase the possibility of a
stable Parliament and better governance. But LeBel J. (speaking for
three judges) found it “hard to imagine how one could prove
empirically” that stable Parliaments provided better governance.133 The
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second is Lavoie, in which the Court rejected a section 15 challenge to
hiring preferences for Canadian citizens in the federal civil service.
Central to the reasoning of McLachlin C.J. in her dissenting reasons
(speaking for two judges) was that the government had adduced no
evidence at all to demonstrate a rational connection between the hiring
preference and the goals of encouraging non-citizens to naturalize and
enhancing the value of Canadian citizenship. She was unwilling to
bridge this gap through reason, logic or common sense, even though the
doctrinal tools were available for her to do so. But Bastarache J.
(speaking for four judges in the majority) was willing to do precisely
that.
In retrospect, it may have been imprudent for the Court in Oakes to
stipulate that the evidence to justify a limitation on a Charter right must
be “cogent and persuasive” in a case in which no government had
attempted to grapple with this requirement and to bring to the Court’s
attention the difficulties attendant in adducing such evidence. It is
interesting to speculate on what the test for section 1 would have looked
like had a re-hearing with interveners been held in Oakes, had Edwards
Books been handed down first, or had Oakes and Edwards been heard
and drafted together.

IV. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON CHAOULLI
For the last two decades, the Court has struggled to come to terms with
the institutional task it set itself in Oakes. In response to the question of
who bears the risk of empirical uncertainty with respect to government
activity that infringes Charter rights, the rights-claimant or the
government, the answer has been, in effect, both. But even though the
Court has agreed on this compromise, deep disagreements persist along
its ragged edges. The Court has yet to work out under what
circumstances it will use common sense, reason or logic to bridge an
absence of evidence, and to delineate when it will allow inferences to be
drawn from inconclusive social science evidence.
Understanding these sorts of problems to be the legacy of Oakes
also allows us to view judgments outside the section 1 context in a
different light. I want to conclude by linking this counter-narrative to
Chaoulli, in which the Court struck down Quebec’s ban on private
health insurance. Although the focus of the case was section 7, Oakes
and the jurisprudence under section 1 have an obvious relevance. To be
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sure, the two provisions have a complicated relationship, since the
principles of fundamental justice are an internal limit on the scope of
section 7 which in theory could do some of the work of section 1. The
Court recently sought to differentiate the two provisions in MalmoLevine, suggesting that:
… for a rule or principle to constitute a principle of fundamental
justice for the purposes of s. 7, it must be a legal principle about which
there is significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way
in which the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be
identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard
against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the
person.134

By contrast, the inquiry under Oakes is rather different.
Unfortunately, the Court has not entirely succeeded in minimizing the
overlap between the two provisions. The key problem is that the Court
has held that section 7 protects individuals from “arbitrary” deprivations
of life, liberty and security of the person, where arbitrary is defined as a
deprivation that “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the
objective that lies behind [it]”.135 This replicates the “rational
connection” analysis of the Oakes test, albeit in a very deferential
fashion. Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasons in Chaoulli further run the
two provisions together by interpreting arbitrariness as connoting
necessity — exactly the sort of inquiry mandated by Oakes. This move
makes directly relevant to the interpretation of the principles of
fundamental justice under section 7 the case law under section 1
subsequent to Oakes.
So how would my counter-narrative of Oakes have assisted the
Court in Chaoulli? In the debate over whether governments should
allow a parallel private system to deliver medically necessary services,
there are two types of disagreements. The first is a disagreement at the
level of principle, over whether individuals should be able to purchase
faster and/or higher quality care on the private market. The second is the
empirical disagreement over the impact of a parallel private system on
Medicare. Quebec had defended the ban on private insurance on the
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basis that doing so was necessary to preserve the integrity of the public
system. This claim was the key point of disagreement between the
majority and the dissenting judges, and, indeed, was the focus of
extensive expert testimony at trial. Health services researchers testified
that a parallel private system would reduce public support for the public
plan because of the possibility of exit. Indeed, those most likely to exit
— the wealthy — also have the greatest power to protect the public
system, because they are disproportionately powerful politically. The
trial court also heard testimony that a private sector would lead to the
bleeding of human resources from the public sector, either if physicians
leave Medicare entirely, or if physicians practising in both sectors
prioritize their private patients. Finally, because private insurers would
cherry-pick the healthiest and wealthiest patients, public health
insurance would be left holding the bag for the sickest and the poorest,
without the ability to pool risk across the entire population.
But there was evidence on the other side. An expert witness, and an
interim report prepared by the Standing Senate Committee on Social
Affairs, Science and Technology pointed to the co-existence of public
and private sectors in a number of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (e.g., the United
Kingdom and New Zealand) to dispute Quebec’s claim that a ban on
private insurance and a public monopoly were necessary to maintaining
quality of care in the public sector.
The trial judge made a definitive finding of fact that Quebec’s fears
were well-founded: “We cannot act like ostriches. The result of creating
a parallel private health care system would be to threaten the integrity,
sound operation and viability of the public system”.136 The dissenters in
the Supreme Court argued that absent a palpable error, the trial judge’s
findings of fact could not be disturbed, and was equally certain in its
conclusions: “Failure to stop the few people with ready cash does not
pose a structural threat to the Quebec health plan. Failure to stop private
health insurance will, as the trial judge found, do so.”137
But the majority strenuously disagreed. Justice Deschamps, writing
for herself, stated that the trial judgment was “based solely on the ‘fear’
of an erosion of services”,138 and that “no study was produced or
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discussed”139 which substantiated this claim. Chief Justice McLachlin
was even harsher, characterizing the empirical arguments both for and
against Quebec’s ban on private health care as “competing but unproven
‘common sense’ arguments, amounting to little more than assertions of
belief”.140 “We are in the realm of theory”, she wrote.141 The tie-breaker
was the evidence from OECD countries, which “refutes the
government’s theoretical contention that a prohibition on private
insurance is linked to maintaining quality public health care”.142
Underlying this factual disagreement was a remarkable degree of
agreement on the nature of the judicial role. Chief Justice McLachlin
was clearest, stating that the courts’ task in Charter challenges to
government policies “is to evaluate the issue in the light, not just of
common sense or theory, but of the evidence”.143 Testable, provable
facts drive adjudication; judges must “look to the evidence rather than to
assumptions”.144 And for the most part, the dissenting judges defined
their task as producing firm conclusions grounded in evidence, which
pointed in the opposite direction. Thus, the trial judge’s definitive
findings of fact merited deference from the Supreme Court. And the
majority’s treatment of OECD data was dismissed as amateur public
policy tourism. The dissenting judges’ assumption through most of its
reasons, like the majority’s, appeared to be that governments had to
meet a stringent test of justification; they only differed on whether that
test had been met.
But in an important sense, setting up the nature of judicial review in
this way misconceived the character of the problem. The trial judge was
too definitive in concluding that private health care posed an
unequivocal threat to the viability of the public system, and so too was
the majority’s position that there was an absence of evidence on the
issue. In reality, the Court was presented with a case in which the
evidence was inconclusive or conflicting. Consider the two most
comprehensive studies of health care reform in recent years, the
Romanow Commission and the Kirby Committee. On the impact of a
parallel private system on public health care, both are equivocal. Thus,
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the Romanow Commission states that “Private facilities … may actually
make the situation worse for other patients because much-needed
resources are diverted from the public health care system to private
facilities”.145 The Kirby Committee is likewise qualified in its
conclusions, suggesting that “allowing a parallel private system … may
even make the public waiting lines worse”.146
Once the problem is framed in these terms, the direct and significant
relevance of the counter-narrative of Oakes is obvious. Indeed, given
that McLachlin C.J. has figured prominently in Canada’s jurisprudence
of self-doubt and empirical uncertainty — in RJR-MacDonald, in Sauvé,
in Lavoie and in Harper — one would have expected this material to be
front and centre in her judgment. Astonishingly, however, she does not
even mention, let alone engage with, these cases. And it is equally
surprising that these cases only make a cameo appearance in the
dissent.147
The Court’s complete failure to cite, follow, or even attempt to
distinguish its own precedents led it to make a fundamental legal error:
it posed the wrong question. The question was not whether Quebec had
convincingly demonstrated that a ban on private insurance was
necessary to maintain the integrity of public health insurance. Rather,
the question was whether Quebec had a “reasoned apprehension of
harm” that opening the door to private insurance would pose this threat.
Instead of proceeding with cocksure certainty, the Court should have
approached the constitutional challenge with self-doubt and judicial
modesty. Mere disagreement with the Quebec government was not
enough. The standard was whether the Quebec government lacked a
“reasonable basis” upon which to proceed, and the materials put into
evidence more than met this attenuated standard. The Court’s disregard
for this evidence is nothing short of astonishing.
Had the Court only grasped the true legacy of Oakes, perhaps it
could have avoided this grave mistake. And if Oakes is a comparative
model for proportionality analysis under other rights-protecting
145
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constitutions, then these kinds of problems are not particular to Canada.
More generally, what is striking about the comparative reception of
Oakes is that neither the narrative nor counter-narrative of the legacy of
the judgment appears to have travelled outside of Canada. Foreign
courts would be wise to grapple with these difficulties with the benefit
of two decades of reflection by Canadian courts instead of simply
applying the Oakes test in its original and undeveloped form.148

148
For a similar view, see M. de Merieux, “Establishing the Democratic Credentials of
Legislation: R. v. Oakes and the Section 4 of the Human Rights Act (1998) (UK)” (2001) 30
Comm. World L. Rev. 193.

